It’s been known since 2012 that a Baltimore-based company called Cyber Point had a contract with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to assist its newly-established signals intelligence agency (then called the National Electronic Security Authority) with “advice on cyberdefense and policy,” as Ellen Nakashima reported at the time for the Washington Post.
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U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) is the U.S. armed forces command charged with offensive and defensive cyber operations. Since 2010, it has coexisted with NSA as two organizations under one director. It is simultaneously embedded within U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), a functional (i.e., non-geographic) command with broader responsibility for detecting and deterring strategic attacks against the United States. Both arrangements are likely coming to an end in the near future.
The House Judiciary Committee will hold a hearing today starting at 10am on the renewal of Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Earlier in 2016, Lawfare, in conjunction with the Hoover Institution’s National Security Working Group, produced a number of papers on the subject. Lawfare readers may be interested in reviewing them in connection with today’s hearing:
On February 8th, six months after his arrest for stealing classified information, a federal grand jury in the District of Maryland indicted former NSA contractor Harold Thomas Martin III, 52, according to the Justice Department’s press release.
On Wednesday, a federal grand jury indicted Harold ("Hal") Thomas Martin III, a former private contractor for Booz Allen Hamilton, of willful retention of national security information. The 20-count indictment describes his unauthorized retention of documents belonging to the National Security Agency, as well as the Central Intelligence Agency, U.S. Cyber Command, and the National Reconnaissance Office; the theft took place over a period as early as 1996 until August 27, 2016.
Late Friday, word came out of NSA that the highly-respected Deputy Director Rick Ledgett would be retiring in the spring. Understandably, people wondered whether this was the first indication of trouble out of the intelligence community under President Trump. Was this a sign that principled career officials were resigning in protest; were they being pushed out in favor of political allies of the White House?
Some months ago, an attorney at the Department of Justice asked Ben about the ethical course of action for career lawyers who view President Trump as a dangerous threat:
In the extraordinary transparency that followed Edward Snowden’s 2013 revelations, one tantalizing mystery remained: how did the NSA persist until early 2009 in querying metadata under the now-replaced section 215 program with search terms (“identifiers”) that lacked a key requirement imposed by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC)? John DeLong and Susan Hennessey recently posted a comprehensive explanation of this serious compliance problem.
In 2009, the government notified the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) of a serious issue in the design and description of the National Security Agency’s (NSA) Business Records metadata program. In short, the NSA had implemented a part of that program using an erroneous interpretation of the term “archived data” that appeared in the court’s order. An inadvertent mistake in later reports to the FISC concealed the fact of the misinterpretation, which was incorporated into multiple reports over time.