GCHQ’s proposal to allow governments to eavesdrop on encrypted communications with a warrant is a backdoor by another name.
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The Levy-Robinson proposal is no less dangerous a backdoor than any others that have been proposed.
A response to Ian Levy and Crispin Robinson’s principles for debate on exceptional access and proposal for conducting such access.
The security community should its time and talents making the digital world safer rather than demolishing what trust and security still remain in our technology, our devices, and our infrastructure.
Even if it could be built, “responsible” law enforcement access technology is not responsible at all.
GCHQ officials outline how to enable the majority of the necessary lawful access without undermining the values we all hold dear.
Over the next few days, a series of essays on Lawfare will capture some of the views presented at the Crypto 2018 Workshop on Encryption and Surveillance.
The statement is an effort by the intelligence alliance to show support for a new Australian proposal on lawful access to encrypted devices. But it ignores technical realities—and certain important signatures are missing.
What’s Involved in Vetting a Security Protocol: Why Ray Ozzie’s Proposal for Exceptional Access Does Not Pass Muster
Ray Ozzie’s proposal for exceptional access has the virtue of being simple. But security can be subtle, and simple solutions often miss critical aspects. This one has.
Building on Sand Isn’t Stable: Correcting a Misunderstanding of the National Academies Report on Encryption
The National Academies’ report on “Decrypting the Encryption Debate” says some computer-security experts have ideas for implementing secure exceptional access to encrypted systems—but that’s a far cry from saying they’re “trying to build” them.